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WHERE, BUT FOR THE GRACE OF GOD, 
GOESHE? THESEARCHFOREMPATHY 
IN THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
CLARENCE THOMAS 
Eric L. Muller* 
I. "BUT FOR THE GRACE OF GOD THERE GO I" 
It was a riveting moment. Asked by a senator "why you 
want this job,"1 then-Judge Clarence Thomas volunteered this to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and the nation: 
You know, on my current court, I have occasion to look out 
the window that faces C Street, and there are converted buses 
that bring in the criminal defendants to our criminal justice 
system, busload after busload. And you look out, and you say 
to yourself, and I say to myself almost every day, But for the 
2 grace of God there go I. 
As an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, Judge Thomas said he would have the chance to "bring 
something different to the Court, ... [to] walk in the shoes of the 
people who are affected by what the Court does. "3 
These striking images were part of a larger strategy to link 
the nominee with the tradition of Thurgood Marshall, the man 
he had been nominated to replace. Marshall had spent a career 
walking in the shoes of the least fortunate, both as an attorney 
and as a judge. President Bush's decision to replace Marshall 
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Brown University; J.D., Yale University. I thank Sara Sun Beale, Leslie Branden-
Muller, Robert Burt, Michael Gerhardt, Joel Selig, Gary Simson, and Maureen Ryan for 
reading and commenting on this essay. I wrote this article while on the faculty of the 
University of Wyoming College of Law; that school's Hopper Research Fund provided 
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I. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 259 (1991) ["Confirmation Hearings, Part 1"]. 
2. !d. at 260. 
3. !d. 
225 
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with Thomas, whose career and commitments seemed so at odds 
with Marshall's, had triggered concern from some quarters, pro-
test from others.4 Judge Thomas's advisers in the Bush Admini-
stration tried to blunt the opposition by encouraging Thomas to 
adopt what they called the "Pin Point Strategy" -a strategy of 
emphasizing his impoverished, racism-tinged upbringing in the 
tiny town of Pin Point, Georgia, rather than his professional ac-
complishments and commitments.5 
The Pin Point Strategy was ultimately a strategy of per-
suading Thomas's inquisitors of his powers of empathy. In his 
opening statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Thomas 
recalled a time just after graduating from Yale Law School, 
when he had no money and no place to live. Margaret Bush 
Wilson, who, Thomas reminded the committee, "would later be-
come chairperson of the NAACP,"6 offered Thomas lodging at 
her house. As he was leaving at the end of the summer, he asked 
her what he owed her. She said, '"Just along the way help 
someone who is in your position. "'7 This was what Thomas said 
he would bring to the Court: a commitment to helping those 
least able to help themselves. "(W]hen all is said and done," 
Thomas concluded, "the little guy, the average person, the peo-
ple of Pin Point, the real people of America will be affected not 
only by what we as judges do, but by the way we do our jobs."8 
Thomas went no further in identifying the "little guy," the 
person "in his position," with whom he professed a special ca-
pacity for empathy. He did not explicitly describe the "little 
guy" as black, or as poor, or as the victim of race- or class-based 
discrimination. But sensitivity to race and class bias were plainly 
behind his words. From the first moment of his testimony, he 
emphasized to the Committee that his life in Pin Point had been 
one of grinding poverty9 and of vicious race discrimination. 10 He 
4. See Timothy M. Phelps and Helen Wintemitz, Capitol Games 61-79 (Hyperion, 
1992) (describing early opposition to Thomas nomination); Manning Marable, Clarence 
Thomas and the Crisis of Black Political Culture, in Toni Morrison, ed., Race-ing Justice, 
En-gendering Power 61, 70 (Pantheon Books, 1992) (describing opposition by black or-
ganizations and leaders). 
5. See Richard L. Berke, In Thomas Hearing Room, Spirits of Hearing Past, N.Y. 
Times, A25 (Sept. 11, 1991); Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the 
Nomination and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 969,971,980-81 
(1992). 
6. See Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 109 (cited in note 1). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at llO. 
9. Id. at 108 ("We lived in one room in a tenement. We shared a kitchen with 
other tenants and we had a common bathroom in the backyard which was unworkable 
and unusable. It was hard, but it was all we had and all there was. Our mother only 
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was also careful to place himself openly on the path of the civil 
rights movement many had accused him of abandoning. He first 
praised Thurgood Marshall as "one of the great architects of the 
legal battles to open doors that seemed so hopelessly and per-
manently sealed and to knock down barriers that seemed so in-
surmountable to those of us in the Pin Point, [Georgia's] of the 
world."n Next came kind words for "[t]he civil rights movement, 
Rev. Martin Luther King and the SCLC, Roy Wilkins and the 
NAACP, Whitney Young and the Urban League, Fannie Lou 
Haemer, Rosa Parks and Dorothy Hite": "But for them," Tho-
mas said, "there would have been no road to travel."12 Finally, 
when the Judiciary Committee took up Anita Hill's allegations 
that he had sexually harassed her, Thomas immediately labelled 
the accusations as racist,13 and based on white America's most 
vicious stereotypes of black men.14 While he did not come out 
and say it in so many words, his message was clear: the "little 
guy" who would be his special concern was the "little guy" who 
had also been the special concern of Justice Marshall.15 
Once Judge Thomas became Justice Thomas, this compas-
sionate image tarnished quickly. Empath~ was difficult to dis-
cern in his dissent in Hudson v. McMillan,' one of his very early 
opinions.17 Prison guards handcuffed and shackled Hudson and 
earned $20 every 2 weeks as a maid, not enough to take care of us. So she arranged for 
us to live with our grandparents later, in 1955. Imagine, if you will, two little boys with all 
their belongings in two grocery bags."). 
10. I d. at 108-09 ("I attended segregated parochial schools. . . . [M)y grandparents 
grew up and lived their Jives in an era of blatant segregation and overt discrimination. 
Their sense of fairness was molded in a crucible of unfairness. I watched as my grandfa. 
ther was called 'boy.' I watched as my grandmother suffered the indignity of being de-
nied the use of a bathroom.") 
11. Id. at 109 (alteration in original). 
12. Id. 
13. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 157 (1991) ("And from my standpoint, as a black 
American, as far as I am concerned, it is a high-tech lynching for uppity-blacks .... ") 
["Confirmation Hearings, Part 4"). 
14. Id. at 202 ("Senator, the language throughout the history of this country, and 
certainly throughout my life, language about the sexual prowess of black men, language 
about the sex organs of black men, and the sizes, et cetera, that kind of language has 
been used about black men as long as I have been on the face of this Earth. These are 
charges that play into racist, bigoted stereotypes and these are the kinds of charges that 
are impossible to wash off."). 
15. See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: 
Bias and lmpaniality of Judges and Jurors, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1201, 1201 (1992) 
("Thomas presented himself as ... enriched by his experiences of poverty and racial dis-
crimination and therefore attentive to the concerns of disadvantaged people."). 
16. 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
17. The Hudson dissent was Justice Thomas's fifth opinion. 
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pummelled and kicked him in the mouth, eyes, chest, stomach, 
and back, while their supervisor warned them "not to have too 
much fun. "18 Hudson emerged from the thrashing with minor 
bruises, a swollen face, mouth, and lip, loosened teeth, and a 
cracked dental plate.19 The Supreme Court held by a vote of 
seven to two that this use of excessive force amounted to cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, even if 
his injuries were not serious.20 In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Thomas criticized the majority for forgetting that "prison was 
not a more con~enial place in the early years of the Republic 
than it is today." 1 Justice Thomas saw the majority's "expansion 
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause beyond all 
bounds of history and precedent" as "yet another manifestation 
of the pervasive view that the Federal Constitution must address 
all ills in our society. "22 "The Eighth Amendment is not, and 
should not be turned into, a National Code of Prison Regula-
tion. "23 
This opinion was the first in a pattern that Justice Thomas 
has followed to the present day. In his first six terms on the 
Court, he has been among the Court's most consistent oppo-
nents of the claims of criminal defendants24-so consistent, in 
fact, that some have wondered whether he was being sincere at 
his confirmation hearings when he professed such empathy for 
the incarcerated inmates he saw streaming from prison buses.25 
18. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4. 
19. ld. 
20. Id. at 5-10. 
21. Id. at 19 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
22. Id. at 28 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
23. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
24. See note 71 and accompanying text. 
25. See Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 983-84 (cited in note 5); Joyce A. 
Baugh and Christopher E. Smith, Doubting Thomas: Confirmation Veracity Meets Per-
formance Reality, 19 Seattle U. L. Rev. 455, 474-80, 495-96 (1996); Anton Bell, Clarence 
Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive, 21 N.C. Central L.J. 194,205,210-12,213-14 (1995). 
There is, of course, a separate literature on the question of whether Justice Thomas was 
truthful at his second set of confirmation hearings, when he denied Professor Anita Hill's 
allegations of sexual harassment. See Jane Mayer and Jill Abramson, Strange Justice 
(Houglton Mifflin, 1994); David Brock, The Real Anita Hill (The Free Press, 1993); Mi-
chael Thelwell, False, Fleeting, Perjured Clarence: Yale's Brightest and Blackest Go to 
Washington, in Morrison, Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power at 86, 115-21 (cited in 
note 4); Curtis D. Lebaron, Looking for Verbal Deception in Clarence Thomas's Testi-
mony, in Sandra L. Ragan, et al., eds., The Lynching of Language 113 (U. of Illinois 
Press, 1996); Gary J. Simson, Thomas's Supreme Unfitness-A Letter to the SeiUJle on 
Ad~·ise and Consent, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 619, 633-36 (1993). One well-known commenta-
tor has even argued that Thomas committed perjury at the second set of hearings, and 
could be impeached for it. See Mark V. Tushnet, Clarence Thomas: The Constitutional 
Problems, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 466,474-77 (1995) (book review). In this essay, I nei-
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How could a Justice "walk[ing] in their shoes"26 rule against 
them so frequently? 
In this Essay I suggest a tentative answer to that question. I 
do so by contrasting two votes of Justice Thomas's, one a dis-
sentinH vote for the criminal defendant in Unite_d States v .. ~il­
liams, a case from 1992, and the other a vote With the maJonty 
for the government in United States v. Armstrong,]ll a 1996 case. 
My answer is tentative because I can base it only on guesswork. 
Justice Thomas did not write an opinion in either of these two 
cases; he merely joined opinions written by others. This essay is 
an attempt-concededly a speculative one-to understand what 
may have prompted Justice Thomas to cast his highly unusual 
vote in Williams. 
The two cases bore important similarities. In both, criminal 
defendants asked the Court to invoke its supervisory power over 
the administration of federal criminal justice29 to require prose-
cutors to honor higher standards of fairness and openness than 
the Constitution and the rules of criminal procedure required. 
In Williams, the defendant contended that the prosecutor should 
be required to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury con-
sidering an indictment. In Armstrong, the defendant sought dis-
covery to support his claim that the prosecutor was illegally sin-
gling out black suspects for prosecution under draconian federal 
crack cocaine laws. The Court rejected both defendants' claims. 
If Justice Thomas were to find his empathic voice in one of 
these cases, Armstrong would have been the more obvious 
choice. Of the two, Armstrong was the case about the "little 
guy;" it engaged far more directly than Williams the sorts of 
compassionate concerns that Justice Thomas voiced so elo-
quently at his confirmation hearings. Yet it was in Williams, not 
in Armstrong, where Justice Thomas broke from his pro-
government ~attern, parted company with his ideological allies 
on the Court, and voted with the criminal defendant. 
ther consider nor question Thomas's truthfulness in responding to Hill's allegations of 
sexual harassment. 
26. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 260 (cited in note 1). 
27. 504 u.s. 36 (1992). 
28. 517 u.s. 456 (1996). 
29. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
30. See note 73; see also Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Er-
ror, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 Yale L.J. 93, 134 n.253 (1996) 
(describing pattern of agreement among Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Jus-
tice Thomas in criminal cases). 
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There is at least faint promise in Justice Thomas's vote in 
Williams; it shows him fulfilling his commitment to Margaret 
Bush Wilson that "along the way [he would) help someone who 
is in [his] position."31 But when compared with the vote in Arm-
strong, his Williams vote also shows that he has yet to broaden 
the range of his empathy much beyond his own unique circum-
stances. The defendant in Williams was publicly accused of seri-
ous wrongdoing by an entity that had before it only the accuser's 
side of the story. For Justice Thomas, the target of Anita Hill's 
leaked accusations of sexual harassment, this must have been a 
painfully familiar scenario-familiar enough to dislodge him 
from his usual pro-government stance and trigger a rare vote for 
a defendant in a case that divided the Court. Williams therefore 
suggests that Justice Thomas can indeed "walk in the shoes"32 of 
the criminal defendant. The trouble is that the shoes must be 
remarkably like his own. 
II. WILLIAMS AND ARMSTRONG 
A. WILLIAMS 
United States v. Williams was a prosecution of an Oklahoma 
businessman for bank fraud. The government's theory of the 
case was that Williams had intentionally submitted misleading 
information to banks in order to obtain loans and loan renew-
als.33 Specifically, the government had evidence that Williams 
had depicted nearly worthless assets as "current assets" worth 
millions of dollars on several financial statements, and on others 
had listed interest income as coming from outside sources when 
in fact it was coming from him.34 On the strength of this evi-
dence, a federal grand jury had indicted him for willfully de-
frauding a bank.35 
What the government failed to do in the grand jury was to 
present rather powerful evidence that tended to show that Wil-
liams had not misled the banks willfully. The government's the-
ory of the case was that Williams had intentionally distorted his 
depiction of his assets in his dealings with the banks. But this 
31. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 109 (cited in note 1). 
32. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 260 (cited in note 1 ). 
33. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 899 (lOth Cir. 1990), rev'd, 504 U.S. 36 
(1992). 
34. ld. 
35. ld. 
1998] EMPATHY AND CLARENCE THOMAS 231 
distortion was not something he shared just with the banks. 
Rather, he characterized his assets the same way everywhere. 
On all of his tax returns and financial statements, and even on 
his own internal ledgers, he accounted for the assets and interest 
income in exactly the same way as he had in his submissions to 
the banks.36 Williams claimed that this evidence was substan-
tially exculpatory because it suggested an innocent explanation 
for the way in which he had presented his assets to the banks. 
Williams asked the district court to dismiss the indictment for 
the government's failure to present this material exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury.37 The district court granted the mo-
tion,38 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.39 
The question for the Supreme Court was whether a federal 
prosecutor must present material exculpatory evidence to a 
grand jury considering an indictment. Williams did not contend 
that the Constitution, federal statutes, or the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure imposed such a duty;40 the grand jufj' has 
historically heard just the government's side of the case, and 
Williams did not contend otherwise. Instead, Williams con-
tended that the district court had the power to impose the duty 
under its supervisory power over the administration of criminal 
justice.42 The supervisory power is an authority of uncertain ori-
gin;43 federal courts use this power to require greater integrity, 
36. Id. at 900. 
37. Id. at 899-900. 
38. I d. at 900. 
39. Id. at 900-04. 
40. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,45 (1992). 
41. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 300 (the grand jury was "only to hear 
evidence on behalf of the prosecution: for the finding of an indictment is only in the na-
ture of an enquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined(.)"); 
Francis Wharton, A Treatise on Criminal Pleading and Practice § 360, at 248 (Kay and 
Brother, 8th ed. 1880) ("The question before the grand jury being whether a bill is to be 
found, the general rule is that they should hear no other evidence but that adduced by 
the prosecution."). 
An excellent history of the grand jury is Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing the 
Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 701 (1972). See also Andrew D. 
Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 
260, 280-88 (1995) (briefly summarizing the checkered history of the grand jury as a 
shield for the accused). 
42. Williams, 504 U.S. at 45. 
43. In her article Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1433 
(1984), Professor Sara Sun Beale argues powerfully that the supervisory power doctrine 
"has blurred the constitutional and statutory limitations on the authority of the federal 
courts_ and has fostered the erroneous view that the federal courts exercise general su-
perviSion over federal prosecutors and investigators." I d. at 1434. She contends that 
while the ~onstit~tional, statutory, and common law powers of the federal courts do sup-
port certam apphcat10ns of the supervisory power, no source of authority supports the 
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accuracy, or fairness in federal criminal proceedings than the 
Constitution, statutes, and rules of criminal procedure demand.44 
The Court rejected Williams's claim. Writing for a bare 
five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia observed that the Court's su-
pervisory power is at its weakest in the context of the grand jury. 
The grand jury, Scalia explained, is virtually a freestanding insti-
tution; it operates almost wholly separately from the courts.45 
Thus, "any power federal courts may have to fashion, on their 
own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited 
one, not remotely comparable to the power they maintain over 
their own proceedings."46 This very limited power, Scalia con-
cluded, could not possibly support Williams's requested disclo-
sure rule. To require the prosecutor to divulge exculpatory evi-
dence to the grand jury would "alter the grand jury's historical 
role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory 
body."47 The supervisory power-whatever its foundation and 
whatever its reaches-would not support such a dramatic recon-
struction of the grand jury. 
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Thomas and Jus-
tices O'Connor and Blackmun. His dissent was perhaps the 
most scathing broadside against prosecutorial misconduct to ap-
pear in the United States Reports since 1935, when Justice Suth-
erland wrote that "while [a federal prosecutor] may strike hard 
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."48 In that case, Jus-
tice Sutherland catalo~ued a number of foul blows that the 
prosecutor had struck, and reversed the conviction to punish 
the prosecutor for the misconduct.50 In his dissent in Williams, 
Justice Stevens picked up where Justice Sutherland had left off. 
Comparing prosecutorial misconduct to the many-headed "Hy-
dra slain by Hercules,"51 Justice Stevens added a number of 
other types of misconduct to Justice Sutherland's list-including 
misconduct in the grand jury.52 He refused to join the majority in 
"hold[ing] that countless forms of prosecutorial misconduct must 
broad power of supervision that the federal courts now claim for themselves. ld. at 1464-
1520. 
44. Id. at 1448-64 (describing the scope of the supervisory power exercised by both 
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts). 
45. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47-50. 
46. Id. at 50. 
47. ld. at 51. 
48. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935). 
49. Id. at 84-88. 
50. ld. at 89. 
51. Williams, 504 U.S. at 60 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
52. Id. at 61-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
1998] EMPATHY AND CLARENCE THOMAS 233 
be tolerated-no matter how prejudicial they may be, or how se-
riously they may distort the legitimate function of the grand 
jury-simply because they are not proscribed" by rule.53 Instead, 
Justice Stevens insisted that "[u]nrestrained prosecutorial mis-
conduct in grand jury proceedings is inconsistent with the ad-
ministration of justice in the federal courts."54 Those courts, he 
concluded, should be permitted to use their supervisory power to 
dismiss indictments tainted by such misconduct. 
B. ARMSTRONG 
United States v. Armstrong also presented the Court with an 
opportunity to use its supervisory power to require more thor-
ough disclosure from federal prosecutors than the Constitution, 
statutes, and rules required. Just as in Williams, however, the 
Court refused to do so. In Armstrong, several black men 
charged with federal crack cocaine offenses in the Central Dis-
trict of California contended that they were the victims of 
impermissibly selective prosecution. They claimed that the 
United States Attorney had selected them for prosecution in 
federal court, where penalties for crack cocaine distribution are 
especially harsh,55 because of their race. They moved in the dis-
trict court for discovery to substantiate that claim. In support of 
their motion they proffered an affidavit demonstrating that 
every one of the twenty-four crack cocaine cases that the Federal 
Public Defender for the Central District of California handled 
during 1991 had been against a black defendant.56 They also 
submitted affidavits suggesting that equal numbers of blacks and 
non-blacks use and deal in crack, and that non-black defendants 
are regularly prosecuted in state court for crack offenses.57 
The district court granted the motion.58 It ordered the 
United States Attorney to provide the defendants with a list of 
cases from the preceding three years in which the government 
had charged both crack cocaine and firearms offenses, to identify 
the race of the defendants in those cases, and to account for why 
those defendants were prosecuted in the federal system.59 When 
the government refused to comply with the discovery order, the 
53. !d. at 68 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
54. Id. at 69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
55. See text accompanying note 110. 
56. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,459 (1996). 
57. Id. at 460. 
58. Id. at 461. 
59. Id.; see also United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 19'95) (en 
bane), rev'd, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
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district court dismissed the indictments.60 An en bane panel of 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal order.61 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. It held that the discov-
ery provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did 
not permit any discovery to support a selective prosecution 
claim,62 and that the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause did not require such discov-
ery in the absence of compelling proof that the government had 
failed to prosecute non-black crack dealers.63 
Justice Stevens again dissented, this time alone.64 He did 
not take issue with the majority's conclusion that neither the 
rules nor the Constitution authorized the district court's discov-
ery order.65 He relied instead on the district court's supervisory 
power,66 as he had in Williams. According to Justice Stevens, the 
district jud§e perceived a "conspicuous racial pattern of cases 
before her" 7 -a pattern emanating from the office of the United 
States Attorney for the Central District of California, "a mem-
ber and an officer of the bar of that District Court."68 Justice 
Stevens concluded that "[i]f a District Judge has reason to sus-
pect that [the United States Attorney], or a member of her staff, 
has singled out particular defendants for prosecution on the ba-
sis of their race, it is surely appropriate for the Judge to deter-
mine whether there is a factual basis for such a concern. "69 
Faced with the "disturbing"70 evidence of racially disparate 
prosecution that the defendants had presented, the district court, 
in Stevens's view, properly exercised its supervisory power over 
the administration of criminal justice by ordering discovery that 
might help explain the disparity. 
III. THE ODDITY OF JUSTICE THOMAS'S VOTES IN 
WILLIAMS AND ARMSTRONG 
By any measure, Justice Thomas's dissenting vote in Wil-
liams was extraordinary. First, and most simply, Justice Tho-
60. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463. 
61. See Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1510. 
62. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463. 
63. ld. at 464-70. 
64. Id. at 476-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
66. I d. (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
67. ld. at 483 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
68. I d. at 477 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
69. ld. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
70. ld. at 483 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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mas's Williams vote was a pro-defendant vote. For each of his 
first five Terms, Justice Thomas was among the Court's most re-
liable opponents of the defendant's position in criminal cases.71 
Second, his Williams vote was a pro-defendant vote in a case that 
was not decided by a unanimous Court. About two-thirds of 
Justice Thomas's pro-defendant votes have come in cases where 
he joined all eight of his colleagues in reaching an uncontrover-
sial pro-defendant position.72 Third, by voting for the defendant 
in Williams, Justice Thomas visibly parted company with Justice 
Scalia, the author of the majority opinion. In each of his first 
five Terms on the Court, Justice Thomas agreed with Justice 
Scalia at least eighty-three percent of the time, and, in one term, 
as much as eighty-eight percent of the time.73 Finally, Justice 
Thomas's split with Justice Scalia in Williams was especially no-
table because Justice Thomas, rather than Justice Scalia, was the 
one to vote for the defendant. Of the eleven criminal cases in 
which Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas parted company during 
71. See Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24 
Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 14-16 (1996) [hereinafter Wilkins, et al., 1995 Voting Behavior] 
(in 1995 Term, Thomas voted for government in 66.7% of state criminal cases and 71.4% 
of federal criminal cases); Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 
1994 Term, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 13, 15 (1995) [hereinafter Wilkins, et al., 1994 
Voting Behavior] (in 1994 Term, Thomas voted for government in 91.67% of state crimi-
nal cases and 61.54% of federal criminal cases); Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme 
Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 269, 286, 290 {1994) [herein-
after Wilkins, et a1.,1993 Voting Behavior) (in 1993 Term, Thomas voted for government 
in 87.5% of state criminal cases and 83.3% of federal criminal cases); Richard G. Wilkins, 
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1992 Term, 8 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 229, 244, 246 
(1994) [hereinafter Wilkins, et al., 1992 Voting Behavior) (in 1992 Term, Thomas voted 
for government in 85.71% of state criminal cases and 81.25% of federal criminal cases); 
Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 B.Y.U. J. Pub. 
L. 1, 13-14 (1992) [hereinafter Wilkins, et al., 1991 Voting Behavior) (in 1991 Term, 
Thomas voted for government in 75% of state criminal cases and 54.55% of federal 
criminal cases). 
72. Justice Thomas cast thirty-two pro-defendant votes in his first five Terms. Of 
these, nineteen were in cases that the Court decided unanimously. See Wilkins, et al., 
1995 Voting Behavior at 15-16 (cited in note 71); Wilkins, et a1.,1994 Voting Behavior at 
13, 15 (cited in note 71); Wilkins, et al., 1993 Voting Behavior at 286, 290 (cited in note 
71); Wilkins, et al., 1992 Voting Behavior at 244, 246 (cited in note 71); Wilkins, et al., 
1991 Voting Behavior at 13-14 (cited in note 71). 
73. See The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 368 {1996) (in 1995 
Term, Thomas and Scalia agreed in 87.2% of cases); The Supreme Court, 1994 Term, 109 
Harv. L. Rev. 10, 341 (1995) (in 1994 Term, Thomas and Scalia agreed in 88.2% of 
cases); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 373 (1994) (in 1993 Term, 
Thomas and Scalia agreed in 82.8% of cases); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, 107 Harv. 
L. Rev. 27, 373 (1993) (in 1992 Term, Thomas and Scalia agreed in 86% of cases); The 
Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 19, 379 {1992) (in 1991 Term, Thomas and 
Scalia agreed in 85.9% of cases). See also Muller, 106 Yale L. J. at 134 n.253 (cited in 
note 30) (noting similarity of Scalia's and Thomas's voting patterns, especially in criminal 
cases). 
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Justice Thomas's first five Terms, 74 Justice Thomas has cast an 
unambiguously pro-defendant vote in only two of them.75 
Perhaps, then, Williams was a case that gave Justice Thomas 
the chance to make good on his commitment to "bring some-
thing different to the Court, . . . [to] walk in the shoes of the 
people who are affected by what the Court does."76 But if he was 
going to pick a single criminal case in which to empathize with 
the plight of a criminal defendant, Williams was an odd choice. 
At his hearings, Thomas testified that his special concern on the 
Court would be "the little guy, the average person, the people of 
Pin Point,"77 as well as the "busload after busload"78 of shackled 
prisoners he saw arriving at the federal courthouse each day. 
John H. Williams was anything but a "little guy," and it is fair to 
guess that his circumstances bore scant resemblance to the con-
ditions of poverty and disadvantage of Thomas's own Pin Point 
years, or of the inmates on the prison bus. Williams was a Tulsa 
businessman and investor whose specialty was venture capital.79 
In the transactions that resulted in his indictment, his invest-
ments in several companies had generated notes receivable, pay-
74. The eleven cases are Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996); Tome v. 
United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995); Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (1995); Thompson v. 
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993); United States v. 
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992); Dawson v. Delaware, 
503 U.S. 159 (1992); and Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
75. In addition to Williams, Justice Thomas split with Justice Scalia and cast an un-
ambiguously pro-defendant vote only in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
For a discussion of that case, see note 141. 
Justice Thomas also paned company with Justice Scalia and cast a pro-defendant 
vote in Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992), but his suppon for the defendant's posi-
tion was at best tepid. In his Richmond concurrence, he explicitly stated that he believed 
the authority on which the majority's opinion partly rested had been wrongly decided. 
See id. at 52-53 (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority only because 
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), which Thomas thought was wrongly decided, was 
still good law). 
Additionally, in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), Justice Thomas parted 
with Justice Scalia and voted for the defendant, but the question in the case was one of 
appellate practice; the beneficiary of Justice Thomas's legal position in the case could just 
as easily have been the government had the case come to the Court in a different pos-
ture. Ornelas established that an appellate court must apply de novo review to a trial 
court's finding on the question of whether law enforcement agents had reasonable suspi-
cion to stop a suspect and probable cause to search. Id. at 1663. The application of this 
standard benefited the defendant in Ornelas because he was the one who had lost in the 
trial court, but the government would benefit equally from de novo review in a case 
where it was the appellant. 
76. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 260 (cited in note 1). 
77. Id. at 110. 
78. Id. at 260. 
79. See United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898,899 (lOth Cir. 1990) (Williams's in-
vestments were in new ventures with negative net worth), rev'd, 504 U.S. 36 (1992). 
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able to him, of between five and six million dollars.80 His busi-
ness dealings and holdings were complex enough to require the 
services of an independent accounting firm.81 The judicial opin-
ions disclose nothing more about Williams. But even this hand-
ful of facts reveals that he probably was not "the average per-
son" to whom Justice Thomas alluded before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. Of the 706 residents of Pin Point, Geor-
gia,82 it seems safe to assume that relatively few are venture capi-
talists. 
Williams was also an odd moment for Justice Thomas to 
find his empathic voice because the defendant's legal position in 
that case was rather tenuous. It is now settled that the federal 
courts enjoy a power to supervise some aspects of the admini-
stration of criminal justice in the federal courts. But supervision 
of the grand jury is at the very fringes of that power, arguably 
beyond them.83 The Court has rejected a number of requests to 
use its supervisory power to alter the grand jury's methods of 
taking evidence, always out of concern for protecting the inde-
pendence of the grand jury.84 In those rare instances when the 
Court has used its supervisory power in the setting of the grand 
jury, it has confined the power to enforcing codified rules;85 it has 
resisted using the power to devise new rules of grand jury prac-
tice.86 Williams was an invitation to use the supervisory power to 
create a brand new rule of grand jury practice; it is not too sur-
prising that the Court declined the invitation. 
80. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899. 
81. Id. at 902. 
82. Telephone Interview with John Powell, Planner, Chatham County-Savannah 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, Savannah, Georgia (May 28, 1997). Mr. Powell 
based his estimate of 706 residents on information he gathered from the 1990 Census. 
He also stated that Pin Point is an old residential neighborhood that has changed little 
for many years, and that its population has remained about the same for decades. 
83. See Beale, 84 Colum. L. Rev. at 1491-93 (cited in note 43). 
84. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) {declining to apply the 
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings because of "the poten-
tial injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury"); Costello v. United States, 
350 U.S. 359, 364 {1956) (declining to enforce the hearsay rule in grand jury proceedings 
because that "would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution."). 
85. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (finding that error involving 
Rule 6(d) did not warrant reversal of convictions); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 
487 U.S. 250 (1988) (affirming Tenth Circuit opinion that district court did not have 
authority to dismiss indictment even though there was a violation of Rule 6(d)). 
86. See generally Beale, 84 Colum. L. Rev. at 1492-93, 1522 (cited in note 43) (ar-
guing that the Court lacks authority to use the supervisory power to impose substantive 
rules of grand jury practice beyond those in Fed. R. Crim. P. 6); United States v. Chanen, 
549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (exercise of supervisory power over grand jury might 
violate separation of powers). 
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Indeed, the government's position in Williams should have 
been especially appealing to Justice Thomas because it was 
deeply conservative-conservative in the sense of tending to 
preserve existing institutions. This sort of conservatism is at the 
core of the judicial philosophy that Justice Thomas and Justice 
Scalia share.81 For example, Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia 
in decrying the Court's prohibition of gender-based peremptory 
challenges in part because the change "imperil[led] a practice 
that has been considered an essential part of fair jury trial since 
the dawn of the common law."88 To make inroads on the free 
exercise of the peremptory challenge was to "vandaliz[ e] our 
people's traditions. "89 Of course, the grand jury has been hear-
ing just the government's side of the case for at least as long as 
lawyers have been using peremptory challenges.90 To require the 
prosecutor to present the defendant's side of the case to the 
grand jury would seem a comparable act of vandalism.91 Yet Jus-
tice Thomas voted for such a change-a perplexing vote for a 
traditionalist. 
Justice Thomas's pro-government vote in Armstrong was 
statistically far less remarkable; it was just another in the largely 
unbroken line of pro-government votes in non-unanimous deci-
sions.92 But Armstrong presented a much more logical place 
than Williams for him to walk in the shoes of "the little guy" to 
whom he referred in his confirmation hearing testimony. First, 
and most obviously, Armstrong was truly a case about the little 
87. On the traditionalism in Justice Scalia's jurisprudence, see Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 
Wis. L. Rev. 303, 315-19; Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 130-31 (Harvard U. 
Press, 1993). Justice Thomas has also been labelled a traditionalist because of his appar-
ent use of the Burkean model as well as some aspects of formalism, see R. Randall Kelso, 
The Natural Law Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court: Not Burke, but the Enlight-
enment Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 St. Mary's L.J. 1051, 
1087 n.l13 (1995); this comes as no surprise in light of his high rate of agreement with 
Justice Scalia. See note 73. 
88. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex ref. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 163 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
89. ld. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
90. See note 41 (summarizing grand jury history); see also Carl Stephenson and 
Frederick G. Marcham, eds. and trans., 1 Sources of English Constitutional History 77 
(Harpers & Brothers, 1937) (predecessor to grand jury, hearing only accusations of 
wrongdoing, mentioned in the Assize of Clarendon of 1166). 
91. Justice Scalia took great pains in Williams to point out how the defendant's 
proposed rule would violate the centuries-old common law of the grand jury. See United 
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51-55 (1992). It was largely for this reason that Justice 
Scalia concluded that the supervisory power "would not permit judicial reshaping of the 
grand jury institution[.)" ld. at 50; see also id. at 52 ("Imposing upon the prosecutor a 
legal obligation to present exculpatory evidence in his possession would be incompati-
ble" with the ancient history of the grand jury). 
92. See note 71. 
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guy, the "busload after busload" of criminal defendants stream-
ing into the federal courthouse. In 1992, Justice Thomas's first 
full year on the Court, forty-three percent of the defendants 
prosecuted in United States District Courts were drug defen-
dants.93 Almost three-quarters of those defendants were de-
tained for some or all of the time prior to trial, and therefore 
transported by bus for court appearances.94 And about one-half 
of all drug defendants were charged with cocaine offenses.95 So 
when Justice Thomas spoke of the "busload after busload" of 
criminal defendants that he saw arriving at the federal court-
house every morning, he was talking about people just like the 
defendants in Armstrong.96 
Second, Armstrong presented a somewhat less controversial 
opportunity than Williams for invoking the Court's supervisory 
powers.97 While the defendant's claim in Williams pushed the 
Court to the very edges of its supervisory power,98 and maybe 
beyond them, the Armstrong defendants sought to engage the 
power a bit closer to its core. As Justice Scalia noted in Wil-
liams, federal courts have long used the supervisory power to 
"control their own procedures" (as opposed to the procedures of 
an independent body such as the grand jury), to "improve the 
truth-finding process of the trial," and "to prevent parties from 
reaping benefit or incurring harm from violations of substantive 
or procedural rules ... governing matters apart from the trial it-
self[.]"99 The Armstrong defendants were seeking a comparably 
ordinary use of the supervisory power: they were asking for pre-
trial discovery. Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts have used the supervisory power to craft rules of discov-
ery and disclosure.100 Justice Thomas is plainly sensitive to 
93. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1995 at 
467 tbl.5.18 (1996) (of 66,502 defendants prosecuted in federal court in 1992,28,479 were 
prosecuted for drug offenses). 
94. Id. at 460 tbl.5.11 (74.9 % of all defendants charged with drug offenses were 
detained for some period of time before trial). 
95. Id. at 440 tbl.4.39 (in 1995, 49.5% of all drug arrests by the federal Drug En-
forcement Administration were for cocaine offenses). 
96. By this I do not mean African-Americans; at his confirmation hearings, Justice 
Thomas did not lay claim to an explicitly race-based empathy in criminal cases, and I am 
not suggesting that he ought to reserve a special degree of compassion for black defen-
dants. Instead, Justice Thomas claimed a special capacity to empathize with disadvan-
taged people generally and with disadvantaged criminal defendants specifically. See Mi-
now, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 1201 (cited in note 15). The Armstrong defendants were 
far more representative of that group than was John Williams. 
97. But cf. note 102. 
98. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
99. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,45-46 (1992) (emphasis deleted). 
100. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-32 (1975) (trial court may use su-
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prosecutorial misconduct- the "Hydra slain by Hercules"101 -
and has no doctrinal qualms about deploying the supervisory 
power to punish and deter such misconduct. His Williams vote 
makes this clear. Armstrong presented a more commonplace 
scenario than Williams for invoking that power,102 yet in Arm-
strong, Justice Thomas refused to do so.103 
Finally, the merits of the Armstrong defendants' claim 
seemed to engage the concerns and views that Justice Thomas 
shared at his confirmation hearings far more directly than a case 
such as Williams. Senator John Danforth introduced Clarence 
Thomas to the Senate Judiciary Committee with the nominee's 
own words from a speech he had given: "What is more amoral," 
pervisory power to compel defendant to disclose defense investigator's report to prosecu-
tor for use in cross-examining investigator); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 
(1957) (district court may use supervisory power to compel government to produce pre-
viously recorded statements of its witnesses for defendant's use in cross-examination); 
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957) (district court may use supervisory 
power to require government to disclose identity of confidential informant who may be 
material witness); United States v. Roybal, 566 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1977) (district 
court may dismiss indictment under supervisory powers to sanction the government for 
failing to comply with discovery order directing it to turn over information not required 
to be produced under the Constitution, statute, or rule); United States v. Fischel, 686 F.2d 
1082, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1982) (district court may use supervisory power to compel gov-
ernment to disclose to defendant the address of an informant whose identity is known). 
Cf. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Supreme 
Court may, in the exercise of its supervisory powers, require in certain circumstances that 
a federal trial court ask voir dire questions of prospective jurors designed to discover ra-
cial prejudice). 
101. Williams, 504 U.S. at 60 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
102. I do not mean to suggest that Justice Stevens's proposed use of the supervisory 
power in his Armstrong dissent was entirely uncontroversial. Part of what made the Wil-
liams majority balk at using the supervisory power was a concern about separation of 
powers: The grand jury is an institution that is separate and largely independent from the 
court. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 47-50); see generally Beale, 84 Colum. L. Rev. (cited in 
note 43) (arguing that exercise of supervisory power to control prosecutors and grand 
juries violates separation of powers). Armstrong presented a similar difficulty. Due to 
separation-of-powers concerns, the courts have long hesitated to scrutinize a prosecutor's 
exercise of discretion over whom and what to prosecute. See Wayte v. United States, 470 
u.s. 598,607-08 (1985). 
Still, in using the supervisory power, the Court has never considered itself as circum-
scribed by the independence of the prosecutor as by the independence of the grand jury. 
While it has balked at altering grand jury practice, it has not hesitated to impose a great 
variety of obligations-including disclosure obligations-on the prosecutor. See note 
100; see generally Beale, 84 Colum. L. Rev. at 1444-55 (cited in note 43). Furthermore, 
even if Justice Stevens's proposed use of the supervisory power in Armstrong was every 
bit as troubling as the rejected use in Williams, the fact remains that Justice Thomas en-
dorsed Justice Stevens's proposed use in Williams, yet refused to do so in Armstrong. 
103. In this Justice Thomas was not completely alone; Justice O'Connor also voted 
against deploying the supervisory power in Armstrong after voting to deploy it in Wil-
liams. Her vote in Williams, however, was neither as striking nor as seemingly revealing 
as Justice Thomas's, because a pro-defendant vote in a criminal case is nowhere near as 
rare an event for her as it has been for Thomas. 
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Thomas had once asked, "than the vicious cancer of racial dis-
crimination[,]" a cancer that "exists in the factories and the 
plants and the corporate board rooms[?]"104 Senator Danforth 
dared the Committee to "[n]ame one other member of the Su-
preme Court that talks like that."105 And Justice Thomas, in his 
own way, continued the dare a few moments later in his own 
opening statement: he focussed unabashedly on the poverty of 
his own childhood in Pin Point, and on the race discrimination 
that he and his family had endured.106 These experiences, and 
the values he had learned in coping with them and in watching 
others do the same, were what he had "always carried in [his] 
heart, "107 and would continue to carry with him in his work on 
the Court.108 
At bottom, the Armstrong defendants' assertion was that 
just as race discrimination exists "in the factories and the plants 
and the corporate board rooms," it could also make its way into 
a prosecutor's office. They claimed that the United States At-
torney for the Central District of California appeared to be se-
lecting only black defendants for prosecution under the harsh 
federal crack cocaine laws. They sought discovery to learn 
whether this was true. 
While the Court dismissed as unconvincing the evidence of 
disparate treatment that the Armstrong defendants tendered,109 
their claim was by no means frivolous. Indeed, their claim ar-
rived in the Supreme Court amid a swirl of very public allega-
tions that the federal sentencing laws for crack cocaine were 
having an overwhelmingly disparate impact on blacks. And 
these were not just allegations from civil rights organizations and 
lobbying groups; these were allegations from the United States 
Sentencing Commission, the federal agency responsible for the 
design of the federal sentencing system. 
In its Omnibus Crime Prevention Act of 1986, Congress 
adopted a one hundred-to-one quantity ratio for determining 
crack cocaine sentences: a defendant convicted of a crack co-
caine trafficking offense would be subject to the same manda-
tory minimum sentence as a defendant convicted of trafficking in 
I 04. Confirmation Hearings, Part I at 97 (cited in note I). 
I05. Id. 
I 06. See notes 9-I 0. 
I07. Confirmation Hearings, Part I at 110 (cited in note I). 
108. Id. 
I09. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,470 (1996). 
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one hundred times as much powder cocaine.110 The federal sen-
tencing guidelines extended this one hundred-to-one ratio above 
the statutory mandatory minimums to all crack cocaine sen-
tences.111 It quickly became apparent that these laws had a dra-
matically disparate impact on blacks: blacks were the over-
whelming targets of crack prosecutions, and received longer 
prison sentences than whites, both for crack offenses and for 
drug offenses overall.112 Congress responded to complaints 
about this disparate impact by directing the Sentencing Commis-
sion to submit a report to it addressing problems in cocaine sen-
• 113 tencmg. 
The Commission's response was blunt: it reached the "ines-
capable conclusion that Blacks comprise the largest percentage 
of those affected by the penalties associated with crack co-
caine"- a "matter of great concern. "114 The Commission noted 
that whereas blacks accounted for 88.3 percent of federal crack 
distribution convictions in 1993, and whites only 4.1 percent, 52 
percent of reported crack users were white, and 38 percent 
black.115 While the Commission found no evidence that Con-
gress enacted the crack sentencing program with a racially dis-
criminatory purpose, the Commission found the program's ra-
cially disparate impact severe enough to warrant change. 
Specifically, the Commission found that the disparate impact 
made it "reasonable to require the existence of sufficient policy 
bases to support such a sentencing scheme regardless of racial 
impact."116 In other words, the Commission concluded that if the 
sentencing laws were to include a penalty differential with a se-
verely disparate impact on a racial group, it would have to sup-
port that differential with clear, and clearly race-neutral, poli-
110. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), (A) (1994). 
111. See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Man-
ual§ 20l.l(c) (19%). 
112. See Douglas C. McDonald and Kenneth E. Carlson, Sentencing in the Federal 
Courts: Does Race Matter?, U.S. Dep't of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics 83-114 (Dec. 
1993); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentenc-
ing Policy, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1233, 1266-71 (1996). 
113. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097 (1994) ("Not later than 
December 31, 1994, the United States Sentencing Commission shall submit a report to 
Congress on issues relating to sentences applicable to offenses involving the possession 
or distribution of all forms of cocaine. The report shall address the differences in penalty 
levels that apply to different forms of cocaine and include any recommendations that the 
Commission may have for retention or modification of such differences in penalty lev-
els."). 
114. U.S. Sentencing Commission: Executive Summary of Special Repon on Cocaine 
and Federal Sentencing Policy, 56 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2159,2168 (March 1, 1995). 
115. ld. at 2167-2168. 
116. ld. at 2168. 
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cies. 117 The Commission unanimously recommended to Congress 
in the middle of 1995-just a few months before the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Armstrong118 - that it scrap the one 
hundred-to-one ratio, replace it with a lesser ratio, and make a 
number of changes to the sentencing guidelines.119 
Against this background, the Armstrong defendants argued 
to the Supreme Court that a federal prosecutor's office appeared 
to be singling out blacks for crack prosecution at the federal 
level. This too was a claim with at least some support. In addi-
tion to the largely anecdotal evidence the defendants themselves 
tendered, a study of crack charging practices in Los Angeles re-
vealed that blacks were significantly likelier than whites to be 
prosecuted at the federallevel. 120 What the defendants sought to 
discover in their case was strikingly similar to what the United 
States Sentencing Commission had found to be dispositive for 
the crack sentencing system as a whole: whether a set of clear 
and race-neutral policies would explain and justify the racially 
disparate pattern. As Randall Kennedy has recently argued, the 
Court should have allowed the trial judge the freedom to order 
such discovery, since the defendants were "seeking [it] based 
upon preliminary indications that should have been seen as 
raising a substantial question re~arding the racial evenhanded-
ness of a U.S. Attorney's Office." 21 
Yet the Court-including Justice Thomas-overturned the 
district court's order requiring the prosecutor to supply the de-
117. See Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, and 
Official Commentary, 57 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2095, 2097 (May 10, 1995); U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission: Materials Concerning Sentencing for Crack Cocaine Offenses, 57 Crim. 
L. Rep. (BNA) 2127, 2131 (May 31, 1995) (majority statement) ("When a sentencing 
policy has a severe disproportionate impact on a minority group, it is important that suf-
ficient bases exist for the policy. The law should not draw distinctions that single out 
some offenders for harsher punishment unless these distinctions are clearly related to a 
legitimate policy goal."). 
118. See United States v. Armstrong, 516 U.S. 942 (1995). 
119. See U.S. Sentencing Commission: Material Concerning Sentencing for Crack 
Cocaine Offenses, 57 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2127 (May 31, 1995). The Commission was 
not unanimous on the appropriate ratio to replace one hundred-to-one. The majority 
favored a one-to-one ratio between crack and powder cocaine quantities. Id. at 2129-30. 
Four dissenters opposed the one-to-one ratio. Id. at 2131-34. 
In October of 1995,just days before the Supreme Court voted to hear the Armstrong 
case, the Congress voted to retain the one hundred-to-one ratio. See Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995). 
120. See Richard Berk and Alec Campbell, Preliminary Data on Race and Crack 
Charging Practices in Los Angeles, 6 Fed. Sent. Rep., 36,36-38 (July-Aug. 1993). But see 
Joseph E. Finley, Crack Charging in Los Angeles: Do Statistics Tell the Whole Truth 
?bout "Selective Prosecution?," 6 Fed. Sent. Rep., 113, 113-15 (Sept.-Oct. 1993) (criticiz-
mg the Berk and Campbell study). 
121. Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 358 (Pantheon Books, 1997). 
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fendants with the information necessary to such an inquiry. Jus-
tice Stevens, in dissent, explicitly linked the discovery issue in 
Armstrong to the simmering public controversy about federal 
crack sentencing: "The extraordinary severity of the imposed 
penalties and the troubling racial patterns of enforcement," he 
wrote, "give rise to a special concern about the fairness of 
charging practices for crack offenses"122 -a concern that the dis-
trict judge was right to explore through the supervisory power. 
Justice Thomas, who learned from his own experience that race 
discrimination is a "cancer ... [that] exists in the factories and 
the plants and the corporate board rooms,"123 might have been 
expected to agree. 
He did not. Instead he voted as he almost always does in 
criminal cases: for the government, and with Justice Scalia. So 
Williams remains the oddity, the outlier, the brief moment of 
empathy in what has so far been a career of little compassion for 
the criminal defendant. Why? What was it that allowed Justice 
Thomas to rediscover, if only for an instant, the compassionate 
voice of his confirmation hearings? 
IV. JOHN WILLIAMS AS CLARENCE THOMAS? 
The answer, I think, lies in the confirmation hearings them-
selves-not the first set, in which the Judiciary Committee ex-
plored Justice Thomas's views and judicial philosophy, but the 
second set, in which the Committee publicly investigated Anita 
Hill's charge that Thomas had sexually harassed her. This sec-
ond set of hearings became necessary after the media learned 
that Hill had given a statement to both the Committee and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation charging Thomas with sexual 
harassment while he was her su&ervisor at the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. Thomas had initially been 
confronted with Hill's allegations confidentially, at his home, 
and he had denied them categorically.125 For about a week, Hill's 
allegations remained confidential. But sometime during that 
week, Hill's statement was leaked to the press. On October 6, 
1991, National Public Radio and a New York newspaper broke 
the story.126 The Judiciary Committee was forced to schedule 
122. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,1494 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
123. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 97 (cited in note 1 ). 
124. See Paul Simon, Advice & Consent 103-08 (National Press Books, 1992); Mayer 
and Abramson, Strange Justice at 241-57 (cited in note 25). 
125. See Mayer and Abramson, Strange Justice at 246-47 (cited in note 25). 
126. Id. at 254-61. 
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additional public hearings into Hill's allegations.m Those did 
not take place until October 11. So for five days the nation 
heard from. Anita Hill and debated her allegations without 
hearing from Thomas. The nation did not hear his side of the 
stor~ until he again took his seat as a witness before the Commit-
tee. 28 
Thomas denied Hill's allegations, as was expected.129 But he 
also pressed further, taking the offensive and attacking the entire 
confirmation process. "My family and I have been done a grave 
and irreparable injustice," he said, referring not just to the "se-
lective[]" and "distorted" leak[ing] of Hill's allegations against 
him, but also to the larger "ordeal" he had been through: 
[C]harges of drug abuse, antisemitism, wife-beating, drug use 
by family members .... Reporters sneaking into my garage to 
examine books I read. Reporters and interest groups 
swarming over divorce papers, looking for dirt. Unnamed 
people starting preposterous and damaging rumors. Calls all 
over the country specifically requesting dirt. 130 
"This is not American," Thomas charged. "This is Kafka-
esque. It has got to stop."131 Calling up a powerful racial image, 
Thomas told the Committee that he would "not provide the rope 
for [his] own lynching or for further humiliation." 132 "Confirm 
me if you want, don't confirm me if you are so led," he de-
manded, "but let this process end." 133 
Later that day, after Anita Hill had spent hours making and 
defending her allegations to the Committee and the nation, 
Thomas appeared again. And this time he was even more ex-
plicit about what was wrong with the proceedings-proceedings 
he said "should never occur in America. "134 The problem was 
that the process was completely one-sided and utterly public: 
127. See Simon, Advice & Consent at 107-08 (cited in note 124). 
128. Justice Thomas made no public appearances during the five days between the 
publication of Anita HiJI's charges and the second round of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's hearings. His only comment came in the form of a terse, five-sentence affidavit 
denying the charges, which Senator John Danforth distributed on his behalf. See Phelps 
and Winternitz, Capitol Games at 268 (cited in note 4). 
129. See Confirmation Hearings, Part 4 at 5-8 (cited in note 13). 
130. ld. at 8. 
131. ld. 
132. Id. at 10; see also id. at 157 (hearings examining Hill's charges were "a high-tech 
lynching for uppity-blacks .... "). 
133. Id. at 9. 
134. Id. at 157. 
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This is a case in which this sleaze, this dirt was searched for by 
staffers of members of this committee, was then leaked to the 
media, and this committee and this body validated it and dis-
played it in prime time over our entire Nation .... This is not 
a closed room .... This is not an opportunity to talk about dif-
ficult matters privately or in a closed environment. This is a 
• 135 
CirCUS. 
The target of his anger was the Committee itself.136 Having 
heard only Hill's side of the story, the Committee had placed its 
imprimatur on Hill's devastating accusations137 by making them 
public and calling on him publicly to respond and defend his ac-
tions and his reputation. And this he saw as an impossible task: 
"There is nothing this committee, this body or this country can 
do to give me my good name back, nothing. "138 
Seen in the light of his experience before the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, Justice Thomas's vote in Williams may become 
more understandable. In the Williams dissent that Justice Tho-
mas joined, Justice Stevens pointed out that the price of prosecu-
torial misconduct before the grand jury is especially high be-
cause a grand jury has a unique capacity to injure a defendant, 
especially an innocent one: "'For while in theory a trial provides 
the defendant with a full opportunity to contest and disprove the 
charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an indictment 
will often have a devastating personal and professional impact 
that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo. "'139 The trial, 
in other words, is just the defendant's appeal from the prosecu-
tor's press release. For Justice Thomas, that may have been the 
insight that resolved the entire case. John Williams had suffered 
the devastation of a public accusation of serious wrongdoing by a 
deliberative body that had heard one side of the story-his ac-
cuser's-but had not heard his. This was Justice Thomas's own 
confirmation saga played out in the setting of a criminal trial. It 
is hard to believe that Justice Thomas could have missed the 
striking similarity between Williams's plight and his own. And it 
is easy to see Justice Thomas's vote as a vote against a kind of 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 185 (charging that the Committee's handling of the hearings was "ruining 
the country"). 
137. When I say that Hill's allegations were "devastating," I do not mean to suggest 
that they were false. As noted earlier, see note 25, I do not address the truthfulness of 
her allegations, or of Justice Thomas's denial, in this Essay. I mean only to suggest that 
from Thomas's perspective, the allegations were surely devastating. 
138. Confirmation Hearings, Part 4 at 9 (cited in note 13). 
139. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 63 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807,817 (3d Cir. 1979)). 
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unfairness that Thomas himself knew all too well from his own 
recent and bitter experience. 
V. AN UNDEVELOPED EMPATHY 
As a young man, Justice Thomas promised a benefactor that 
he would help someone in his position.140 I believe that he found 
that someone in John Williams. 141 And if so, he should not be 
criticized for that. Thomas learned from painful personal expe-
rience how catastrophic a public charge of wrongdoing can be, 
and when the time came, he allowed that heightened sensitivity 
to inform his understanding of what might have otherwise 
seemed a dry question of grand ~ury practice. This is what we 
expect of Supreme Court justices: 42 We hope that their delibera-
tions, votes, and opinions will reflect not just what they have 
140. See text accompanying note 7. 
141. It is tempting to say that Justice Thomas may also have met such a someone in 
Keith Jacobson, the defendant in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), the only 
other case in which he split with Justice Scalia to cast an unambiguously pro-defendant 
vote. See note 75. In that case Justice Thomas joined a bare five-justice majority in 
holding that the government had entrapped Jacobson into buying child pornography by 
trying over and over again for years to entice him into a purchase without any evidence 
that he had ever bought child pornography before. The majority opinion, which Justice 
Thomas joined, expressed disgust with the government's investigative methods in the 
case: "When the Government's quest for convictions leads to the apprehension of an 
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run 
afoul of the law, the courts should intervene." Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54. 
It would not seem outlandish to speculate that Justice Thomas's own experiences 
with "(r]eporters sneaking into my garage to examine books I read(.] (r]eporters and in-
terest groups swarming over divorce papers, looking for dirt," Confirmation Hearings, 
Part 4 at 8 (cited in note 13), may have sensitized him to overly prying and intrusive law 
enforcement techniques. In fact, Jane Mayer and Jill Abramson have reported that a 
former clerk of Justice Thomas's chalked up his vote in Jacobson to his confirmation ex-
periences: "[A]fter all Thomas had gone through, the justice was especially sensitive to 
the overreaching powers of prosecutors." Mayer and Abramson, Strange Justice at 358 
(cited in note 25). However, the breadth of the clerk's assertion about Thomas's sensi-
tivity to prosecutorial misconduct seems questionable; Justice Thomas has not seen fit to 
condemn other instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 456 (1995) (5-4 decision) (Justice Thomas dissenting from Court's conclusion 
that prosecutor in state trial suppressed material exculpatory evidence). 
142. Indeed, we tend to worry a bit about justices who seem to lack broad experi-
ence: such was the case when the allegedly hermitic David Souter was nominated to the 
Court. See Ruth Marcus and Michael Isikoff, Souter Declines Comment on Abortion, 
Nominee Moves to Dispel Image as Judge Lacking Compassion, Wash. Post, A1 (Sept. 
14, 1990); Keith C. Epstein, Souter Appears to Shun Current Events, Plain Dealer 
(Cleveland), 1990 WL 4622518 (Sept. 9, 1990); Roy L. Brooks, Weigh Souter's Human 
Resume, Houston Chron., 15 (Aug. 2, 1990); Ray Gibson & Mitchell Locin, Souter's Ca-
reer Largely Untouched by Broad Issues, Chi. Trib., 1 (July 29, 1990); Carl M. Cannon, 
Souter, Others Singled Out for Never Having Tied Knot, Orange County Reg. (Cal.), 1 
(July 29, 1990). 
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learned from briefs and books, but also what they have seen in 
their personal and professionallives. 143 
However, Justice Thomas's Williams vote stands virtually 
alone. 144 The nominee who claimed a unique ability to imagine 
himself as the inmate on the prison bus has rarely displayed that 
imagination in his first years on the Court. He proved himself 
unable to step into the shoes of the defendants in Armstrong, 
just as he was unable to step into the shoes of the pummeled in-
mate in Hudson v. McMillan or the defendants in so many of the 
other criminal cases he has been called upon to review. A wide 
gap has opened between his words as a nominee and his votes as 
a justice. The gap is hard to miss, and commentators have not 
missed it. They have asked whether Thomas may have been in-
sincere when he told the Judiciary Committee that he looked 
upon the busloads of inmates arriving at court each morning and 
said to himself "But for the grace of God there go I. "145 
His vote in Williams suggests that he was not entirely insin-
cere. But compared to his vote in Armstrong and dozens of 
other criminal cases, it also suggests that he has not yet broad-
ened his empathy to anything like the full range he promised at 
his confirmation hearings. To say "[b]ut for the grace of God 
there go 1," as Justice Thomas himself explained, is to recognize 
that "you have the same fate, or could have, as those individu-
als"146 -the inmates on the bus. To empathize with someone 
who actually shares your fate is not especially difficult; this was 
the empathy that I believe motivated Justice Thomas in Wil-
liams. On the other hand, to empathize with a criminal defen-
dant whose fate could have been yours under different condi-
tions is a good deal harder. 147 The effort carries with it enormous 
danger: feelings of kinship with someone accused of serious 
crime can tri~er revulsion and fear just as easily as compassion 
and support.1 If Justice Thomas does feel a unique kinship with 
143. See Minow, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 1203 (cited in note 15) ("We ... want 
[those who sit in judgment] to have the ability to empathize with others, to know what is 
fair in this world, not in a laboratory. And we want ... judges to have, and to remember, 
experiences that enable their empathy and evaluative judgments."). 
144. See notes 71·75 and accompanying text. 
145. See note 25. 
146. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 260 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added). 
147. Charles Black identified this difficulty, and preached the necessity of overcom-
ing it, in his moving essay, "The Humane Imagination in the Great Society." See Charles 
L. Black, Jr., The Humane Imagination in the Great Society, in The Humane Imagination 
1, 4·7 (Oxbow Press, 1986). 
148. Indeed, revulsion and fear might be the likelier response. It is not pleasant to 
dwell on the fact that you and a dangerous criminal have something-perhaps even the 
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the inmates on the prison bus, it is by no means clear that that 
feeling of kinship will produce actions we would recognize as 
compassionate. The road on which Justice Thomas set himself 
at his confirmation hearings is a decidedly rocky one. 
It is also, however, a road that others have travelled before 
him. Other Justices who came to the Court marked as outsiders 
by race or religion have struggled to define the appropriate 
scope of their empathy for, in Justice Thomas's words, "the little 
guy." Justice Felix Frankfurter claimed for himself a unique ca-
pacity for empathy with the outsider because of his membership 
in (in his words) "the most vilified and persecuted minority in 
history."149 But Frankfurter never developed a jurisprudence of 
empathy for the outsider. He became instead, in the words of 
one commentator, "an overeager apologist for the existing or-
der."150 On the other hand, Justices Louis Brandeis and Thur-
good Marshall more eagerly embraced their status as outsiders 
in developing judicial philosophies that were more indulgent of 
the claims of the little guy and more suspicious of the existing 
order-even though their views often placed them in lonely dis-
sent.151 If Justice Thomas chooses the path he identified at his 
raw potential for dangerous crime-in common. People develop defenses to protect 
themselves from the anxiety of such insights, and one common mechanism of defense is 
what psychoanalytic theory calls "reaction formation." See Lawrence Pervin, Personal-
ity: Theory Assessment, and Research 231-33 (Wiley, 1970). In reaction formation, a per-
son "defends against expression of an unacceptable impulse by only recognizing and ex-
pressing its opposite," often in a rigid and exaggerated way. !d. at 232. In this way, a 
person trying in good faith to place himself in the shoes of a criminal might well be led to 
express great hostility toward him, rather than compassion. One prominent psychiatrist 
has argued that this dynamic of defense is at the heart of the criminal sanction generally. 
See Karl A. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment 153 (The Viking Press, Inc., 1968) 
("We need criminals to identify ourselves with, to secretly envy, and to stoutly punish. 
Criminals represent our alter egos-our 'bad' selves-rejected and projected. They do 
for us the forbidden, illegal things we wish to do and, like scapegoats of old, they bear the 
burdens of our displaced guilt and punishment(.]"); cf. Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? 
Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1149, 
1235-36 (1990) (suggesting that retributive urge may stem from recognition that criminals 
are "no different from us."). 
149. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting). 
150. Robert A. Burt, Two Jewish Justices 60 (U. of California Press, 1988); see also 
H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 171-76, 191-200 (Basic Books, Inc., 1981) 
(describing singlemindedness of Frankfurter's commitment to judicial deference to the 
majoritarian branches, even in areas of individual liberties). 
151. See Burt, Two Jewish Justices at 6-36 (cited in note 150) (describing Brandeis's 
"self-conscious marginality" and "passionate espousal of the outsider's perspective" 
throughout his career); William J. Daniels, Justice Thurgood Marshall: The Race for 
Equal Justice, in Charles M. Lamb and Stephen C. Halpern, eds., The Burger Court 212, 
235 (U. of ~l~inois Press, 1991) (describing Marshall's commitment to the disadvantaged 
and his positiOn as "foremost a dissenter" on the Burger Court). For a perceptive discus-
sion of Brandeis's autonomy and detachment from the established order-and even at 
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hearings, he will not walk alone; he will have the rich and varied 
experiences of those who went before him as a guide. 
There is little in Justice Thomas's record in criminal cases to 
date that shows him attempting the decidedly tricky task of al-
lowing his professed kinship with the inmate on the prison bus to 
influence his outlook. With each passing term, his commitment 
to the task seems more questionable.152 But it is a task he set out 
for himself in a very public way. If he has the will, his youth and 
his life tenure leave him plenty of time to attempt it. 
times from the perspective of his own clients-see Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: 
Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 Yale L.J. 1445 (1996). 
152. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1971 (1997) (Thomas, J.) (rule 
requiring jury instruction to capital sentencing jury that life sentence means life without 
parole where state argues defendant's future dangerousness was new rule and therefore 
unavailable to capital defendant on habeas corpus); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 
2076 (1997) (Thomas, J.) (statute permitting indefinite commitment upon expiration of 
criminal sentence of those with abnormality or disorder making them likely to engage in 
predatory acts of sexual violence does not violate the Constitution). 
